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Abstract 
 American plans for Missile Defence (MD) and the weaponisation of space 
should be analysed in the larger framework of the contemporary Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA).1  Soviet military analysts have written about this revolution 
from as early as the 1970s, but it was the application of information age technology 
(IT) in the 1991 Gulf War that captured the imagination of military planners and 
policy makers, especially in the US. The US is actively pursuing an RMA, 
conceptualised as integrating new IT into weapons systems and integrated 
command, control, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) and, in turn, doctrinal, operational and organisational change in the military 
to take advantage of information dominance on the battlefield.  This relates to MD 
and the weaponisation of space in two ways.  Firstly, very few countries have the 
financial and technological capability to modernise their defence forces along the 
lines of a US-defined RMA, which means that they may resort to so-called 
asymmetric means to exploit the vulnerabilities or weaknesses of a strong, 
conventional power. Ballistic missiles (in association with chemical, biological or 
nuclear payloads) are one of the asymmetrical threats most commonly cited in 
speeches and military documents of the US and used as justification of MD. 
Secondly, the RMA increases the US military’s reliance on space-based military 
assets for C4ISR.  Placing weapons in space to protect these assets is seen as a 
logical step to ensure a key aspect of US dominance on the battlefield. This paper 
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explores the extent to which the strategic framework of the RMA has a bearing on 
US MD and space weaponisation arguments.  
 
Introduction 
 Strategy is what connects military power to political purpose; it is neither 
military power as such nor political purpose. Strategy is the use of force and threat 
of force for the ends of policy or as Clausewitz had it “the use of engagements for 
the object of the war.”2  A strategic framework therefore sets out a plan of action to 
achieve stated goals. In the case of the US the RMA is key to this plan of action. 
Some of the goals to be reached through the RMA can be traced as far back as 
World War II, while others are a response to the post-Cold War security 
environment as manifested most explicitly by the September 11 attacks on the US. 
The strategic framework as it is pursued today can also not be seen separately from 
the current US administration and the neo-conservatives’ control of the security 
agenda. This paper sets out to frame US plans for MD and the arguments for the 
weaponisation of space within the discourse of the RMA as the strategic framework 
within which the US is trying to reach its defence goals. As such the article is 
essentially confined to an analysis of US strategic conceptions.3 
 
US defence goals and the RMA 
 In order to understand the RMA as a plan of action it is important to 
understand the defence goals of the US and from there infer the reasons why the 
RMA is seen as the preferred plan of action to reach these goals. This section will 
discuss these goals within the context of three factors: the need for precision strike, 
the post-Cold War context and ‘neo-conservatism’. 
 
The need for precision strike 
 During both world wars the human carnage as a result of imprecise bombing 
was appalling.  In order to hit a target, hundreds of bombs were dropped as close as 
possible to the target. During its involvement in World War II the US initially 
favoured a strategy of precision bombing but the lack of technology meant that they 
had to bomb in daylight, which resulted in planes and men lost to the enemy. Later 
the US chose the strategy of area bombing, most notably the fire-bombings of 
Japanese cities. As the international norm against indiscriminate attack grew the US 
engaged technology to develop precise strike capabilities without putting US Air 
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Force (USAF) aircraft at risk. More humane warfare, it is argued, underlies the 
current strategic framework. The so-called CNN effect, i.e. the ability of news media 
to cover wars and broadcast images almost globally, enhances the prominence of 
this goal in the light of public revulsion of civilian suffering during wars. 
 
The post-Cold War context 
 The strategic environment that characterised the Cold War era and informed 
military doctrine (doctrine can be defined as ‘codified precepts that govern military 
operations’4) was a bipolar configuration between two superpowers that relied on 
mutually assured destruction to deter one another and consequently to keep their 
animosity cold. The post-Cold War context is one of multipolarity.5 Moreover, the 
symmetry of military power between the superpowers has given way to asymmetry 
in two ways. Firstly, the US has overwhelming conventional military power. 
Secondly, weaker parties may wish to acquire asymmetric means (not least nuclear, 
chemical and biological (NCB) weapons) to defend against or challenge a 
conventionally stronger state. This is sometimes perceived by conventionally 
stronger states as a means for weaker parties to hold strong states to ransom. 
Asymmetric parties also include non-state actors, most notably terrorists. The 
terrorist threat, played out on September 11, created the confirmation/justification 
for these perceived threats.  The US National Security Strategy Report (2002) puts 
the attacks in (US) perspective by saying that if terrorists could inflict such damage 
with resources that hardly amount to the cost of one tank, what more are they not 
capable of if they exploit technologies and acquire chemical, biological, nuclear and 
information weapons. Rogue states drawing on the financial and human resources of 
a state can do even more harm.6 Essential to this argument is the proliferation of 
missile technology that has been in excess of intelligence expectations as well as the 
ability of rogue states to develop NCB weapons programmes.7 The A.Q. Khan 
missile and NCB technology network served as confirmation of this perception. The 
proliferation of missile technology along with the September 11 attacks confirmed 
for the US that geographic location no longer precludes direct attack.  
 From a US security perspective, the multiplicity of actors (who are less 
identifiable and predictable) and the proliferation of technologies previously 
monopolised by major powers form important drivers of uncertainty in the post-Cold 
War context. This uncertainty questions the value of Cold War nuclear doctrine and 
the ability of nuclear weapons to deter NCB threats as well as conventional (and 
asymmetrical) challenges to US security (and that of ‘friends and allies’). It begs a 
strategy that is more flexible to address the different contingencies that uncertainty 
from potential adversaries and their capabilities may require.8 
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 In response to the post-Cold War context, the US identified the following 
defence goals:9 
• To assure US allies and friends of ‘US steadiness of purpose and ability to 
fulfil security commitments.’ The implications of assurance as a military 
goal relates to horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as the US 
nuclear umbrella and MD may keep Japan and Taiwan from ‘going 
nuclear’ in the face of regional nuclear threats posed by countries such as 
China and North Korea. However, it may have a negative effect on 
vertical proliferation as China may wish to increase its nuclear missiles in 
the face of Taiwan being protected by MD. The goal of assurance also 
sends a clear message that US defence is not confined to the homeland, 
but takes on a global nature that also involves creating regional security 
balances to protect the interests of allies and friends. 
• To dissuade future military competition. It is important to note that 
dissuasion is not only directed against NCB weapons acquisition by 
adversaries, but against military competition in general. The means of 
dissuasion is identified as research, experimentation, test and 
demonstration programmes. (The Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 
2001 (QDR) does not mention of what, but in subsequent documentation it 
is clear that these programmes include conventional, nuclear and space 
weapons). Moreover, a culture in the military that embraces innovation 
and risk-taking is seen as essential to dissuasion. The Iraq War can be 
construed as having the intended effect of dissuading other nations to pose 
a challenge to US interests. 
• To deter threats against US interests, allies and friends, i.e. to discourage 
aggression or any form of coercion of the US, their allies or friends.  Also, 
to do this through ‘forward deterrence’ in peacetime by deploying forces 
forward in critical areas.  There has been an expansion in these forward 
deployed forces, and the US is even expanding further into Africa.10 
• To decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails. This military goal is 
as much offensive as it is defensive in that the QDR explains that the US 
must have the capability to ‘impose its will’ on an adversary and this could 
include regime change and/or occupying foreign territory. 
 On face value, these goals are not radically different from the Cold War era, 
but the means of achieving them are.  Here defence documentation highlights new 
approaches, namely: 
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 The shift from a threat-based to a capabilities-based model for defence 
planning: In the Cold War the Soviet Union and its allies were the identified threat, 
and defence capabilities were designed to counter that threat.  In the absence of 
certainty of which states and non-state actors may pose a threat to its security, the 
US is planning to defend against the probable capabilities with which an adversary 
might challenge the US. The emphasis is thus not on whom the adversary is, but all 
the conceivable ways in which the US and its allies might be challenged. This 
involves not only developing asymmetrical military capabilities in terms of US 
superiority, but also denying adversaries the possibility to develop asymmetric 
means with which to counter US superiority. 
 The shift from nuclear to conventional deterrence: The credibility of nuclear 
deterrence in the post-Cold War context is called into question, not least because 
terrorists are not linked to territory or a nation that can be threatened with massive 
retaliation in the same sense as state actors are. At most nuclear deterrence can be 
directed against states that support terrorism, but even then a nuclear response can 
not be justified, especially if these countries themselves do not have nuclear 
weapons and are not directly responsible for an attack. Nuclear deterrence doctrine 
is only useful to deter against ‘direct’ nuclear and conventional attack from another 
state actor.  In this light, conventional deterrence seems more credible for the 
purposes of imposing the US’s will on states (a much broader objective than merely 
defence against direct attack).  The means of conventional deterrence are 
intelligence capabilities that would allow knowledge of adversaries’ military 
intentions and programmes, precision attack capability of static, mobile and deeply 
buried targets and rapidly deployable forces that can be maintained in a hostile 
country.11 Whereas nuclear weapons deter by threatening mass destruction, 
conventional deterrence is on the level of fighting.12 This does not mean that the US 
will give up its nuclear arsenal. The Nuclear Posture Review notes that a new triad 
of nuclear, non-nuclear, and defensive capabilities should be sought. This may 
explain research into new nuclear weapons that might be used in ‘conventional 
warfare’, such as Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrators that would target deeply buried 
bunkers suspected as NCB weapons factories/arsenals or low yield nuclear weapons, 
so called mininukes that would approach the explosive yield of conventional 
bombs.13 These programmes confirm the move to conventional deterrence by even 
making nuclear weapons more ‘useable’ on the level of fighting.14 
 Prevention and pre-emption: To achieve military goals US policy has also 
shifted from retaliation to preventive attack. The extent of this shift only becomes 
clear when preventive attack as a means of offensive defence is juxtaposed against 
pre-emptive attack. A pre-emptive strike in the face of an imminent attack is 
justified in international law, but preventive attack is not. Although the US has 
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called the War on Iraq pre-emption in the light of Iraqi (presumed, but never found) 
weapons of mass destruction, the threat of attack against the US or its allies was not 
imminent and therefore it could only be argued that the war was preventive. 
 
Neo-conservatism 
 The policy goals and ways of achieving them, which determine the US 
strategic framework, cannot be seen separately from the neo-conservatives that have, 
since September 11, made inroads into the US security policy apparatus. The neo-
conservatives originated from the Democratic Party in the late 1960s during the 
Vietnam War when they broke with the liberal democrats, who were against the 
Vietnam War.15  During the Reagan presidency they influenced foreign and strategic 
policy by labelling the Soviet Union an ‘Evil Empire’ and supporting a military 
build-up intended to bankrupt the Soviet Union if the latter tried to keep up with the 
US. For them it was a question of winning the Cold War. It is also significant that it 
was during the Reagan presidency that the US last saw a space programme 
(Strategic Defence Initiative or ‘Star Wars’) comparable with what is currently on 
the table. Once George Bush (senior), a conservative realist, who believed in 
multilateralism, came into power, he dismissed neo-conservatism and during 
Clinton’s presidency the same was true.  But the ‘neo-conservative agenda’ has in 
recent times gained much ground in George W. Bush’s presidency and this agenda is 
characterised by the following: 
• Disdain for multilateral organisations (and treaties): This relates to a belief 
that states, that are hostile towards the US, will use these organisations to 
curtail US power or to build their own power under the protection of these 
organisations.16 The disdain for international organisations also results 
from the view that these organisations and treaties are ineffective when it 
comes to enforcing norms of non-proliferation and arms control. In this 
respect, North Korea, Iraq and Iran (the infamous axis of evil) are 
portrayed as examples of states that have been able to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction or covert programmes to build these weapons while 
signatories to the NPT.  There seems to be increasing evidence that the 
disdain for multilateral organisations expands to NATO in that the NATO 
framework may be more of a liability for swift and flexible military action 
if and when the US wants to ‘project force’. Although not explicitly 
negative towards NATO, the National Security Strategy Report 
emphasises a list of changes necessary to carry out missions under new 
(supposedly post-Cold War) circumstances.17  However, the emphasis on 
‘coalitions of the willing’ in the same report and the way in which the US 
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has sought support outside NATO for its operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq suggests that America is moving beyond NATO confines to achieve 
military goals. 
• US exceptionalism: The US should not have to give away an inch of its 
sovereignty. This also corresponds to a notion of ‘wrongdoers’ as opposed 
to ‘wrongdoing’ in American foreign policy. Israel as a US ally is, for 
example, not regarded in the same light as North Korea, despite the 
former’s covert nuclear weapons programme.   
• A Wilsonian quest to spread democracy: Wilson, when declaring war 
against Germany in World War I said that the US had no quarrel with the 
German people, but with their authoritarian leaders. He firmly believed 
that the world should be made safe for democracy even if it takes force to 
do so. Premised on democratic peace theory (i.e. the notion that 
democracies do not wage war with one another), by spreading democracy 
world peace will be expanded as well. The same themes are echoed by the 
Bush (II) Administration, especially, but not exclusively, with respect to 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Spreading democracy is entwined with spreading 
free enterprise and liberal economic values. The spread of democracy and 
free enterprise are seen as key elements of the promotion of human 
dignity. 
• A distinctive moral element: This is seen as the US’s moral responsibility 
to take on the role of liberating people from dictators.18  This element 
extends to state-building in weak states, not least because these states are 
fertile ground for terrorists. 
 The objectives as outlined above have both been informing as well as been 
informed by what is referred to as the current RMA.  
 
The Revolution in Military Affairs 
 Based on the premise that the way in which wars are fought undergo from 
time to time ‘discontinuous change’ as new technology or organisational concepts 
are introduced to increase military dominance, the current revolution involves the 
incorporation of information technology into weapons systems, doctrine and 
organisation. States that exploit the RMA will have military advantage and 
therefore, in the context of the capability-based approach as highlighted above, US 
strategy documentation makes it clear that the US has to 
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• exploit the RMA and as such extend US military superiority into the 
future;  
• guard against the possibility of states hostile to the US exploiting military-
technical developments and challenging US military superiority; and 
• prevent states from acquiring asymmetric means to decrease the value of 
the RMA to the US (or the US should acquire defence systems that will 
render asymmetric means of other states strategically useless, most 
notably MD). 
 It is especially the latter two that relate to weapons in space and MD, but 
before turning to them it is important to outline how the US has conceptualised the 
RMA by looking at the characteristics thereof as it manifests in US military 
planning, doctrine and operations (most notably in recent warfare):19 
 Precision-guided munitions: In Operation Desert Storm (the Gulf War of 
1991) nine percent of the bombing was precision-guided.  In Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (the recent Iraq War), at the point when formal combat operations were 
declared over, this figure had increased to 70 percent.  The use of radar (JSTARS - 
Joint Surveillance and Targeting Radar System) and Geographical Positioning 
System (GPS) and inertial guidance systems (both used in JDAMS – Joint Direct 
Attack Munitions System) in precision attack has meant that the US military has the 
ability to bomb military targets with lethality and accuracy - even in difficult 
environments, such as cities.   
 In strategic terms precision attacks support the Sun Tzu principle of 
“disarming an adversary before battle”.20 During the Iraq War it made possible the 
first phase of the war, i.e. decapitation (taking out the Iraqi leadership), as well as 
the second phase of ‘Shock and Awe’21 where imposing ‘rapid dominance’ through 
inflicting ‘overwhelming force’ was intended to render large parts of the Iraqi forces 
impotent whether as a result of real damage or through psychological effect.  
 This does not necessarily mean more humane warfare. The Project for 
Defence Alternatives (PDA) reported that both the absolute number and the 
proportion of non-combatants among Iraqi casualties were higher in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom than in Operation Desert Storm. What stands out in both these wars is the 
low ratio of US and British fatalities to Iraqi ones (a ration of 70–90 to 1). The 
relatively low Anglo-American casualty rate aside, both of the wars had death tolls 
comparable to many strategically significant wars of the past 40 years and as such 
“do not stand out unambiguously as 'low casualty' wars.”22 
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 Network-centric warfare: The interconnection of dispersed commanders, 
sensors, weapons and troops through a robust information network is referred to as 
network-centric warfare.  Participants in this network have the capacity to develop a 
shared and real-time awareness of the battlefield. Commands can also be passed 
more rapidly than by the adversary.23 This is said to lift the ‘fog of war’, often the 
cause of casualties by friendly fire. 
 The Afghan model: Part of the RMA is the increasing reliance on smaller, 
specialised forces as was done in the Afghan War.  This is partly to prevent taking 
casualties and the resultant political cost of soldiers returning home in body bags. It 
involves Special Operations Forces identifying targets and directing air strikes as 
well as a common command-control-communications-computers-intelligence-
surveillance-and-reconnaissance (C4ISR)24 grid linking these forces (network-
centric warfare). Information is thus relayed not only to command and control 
centres in the theatre, but also to headquarters (in the Afghan and Iraq Wars this 
meant headquarters in the US) and platforms outside of the theatre (in the area of 
responsibility), such as aircraft carriers. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are used 
to collect intelligence and beam images of the battlefield through the integrated 
information grid for hours. Special forces were also used to train and equip local 
forces in Afghanistan.25 
 Information operations: An element of the RMA is the increased 
prominence of information operations, i.e. taking advantage of the power of 
information and information technology and integrating all aspects of information to 
enhance military operations. As such information operations have an offensive and 
defensive dimension. Offensively it includes denying the adversary the benefits of 
information through deception and incapacitation (for example the US’s reported 
use of HPM (High-powered Microwave) bombs (or e-bombs) to disable Iraqi 
computer and communication systems) as well as psychological operations, 
electronic warfare and ensuring and enabling means to collect and process 
information that could result in military advantage.26  The emphasis is thus on 
information dominance in the battle space and this dominance is key to military 
victory. Defensive information operations may include ensuring information security 
and defence of critical infrastructure in homeland defence, because the everyday 
reliance of a country’s health, water, electricity, and transport infrastructure on 
computers may make it vulnerable to cyber attack and potential disruption. 
 RMA is in essence the paradigm within which US military planners see 
military transformation occurring and the role of space in bringing about this 
transformation is explicit in US strategy documentation. 
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Space and the RMA 
 Space is seen as “a critical strand of DNA for US military transformation.”27 
The link between space and the RMA is threefold: 
 Space enables the current RMA: It enables the preferred way of warfare for 
the US, through satellites that are used for imaging, communication and precision 
guidance. As such the US is increasingly dependent on space. This is a ‘chosen’, not 
a ‘necessary’ dependence, because the US pursues the RMA type of war fighting 
that centralises C4ISR capabilities. US space assets, it is argued, are vulnerable to 
attack both in space as well as ground stations through physical attack or 
interference through electronic jamming. The contingency of a low yield nuclear 
explosion above the earth’s atmosphere to damage nearby satellites is also 
mentioned in the US Space Commission Report.28 In effect, by putting more eggs in 
the space C4ISR basket, the US military has created vulnerability. But, this is not to 
say that an attack on US military satellites would leave the US ‘blind’ in the 
battlefield or severely undermine its military superiority. The Space Commission’s 
warning that a “Space Pearl Harbor” could occur was regarded as alarmist, not only 
because it overestimated other countries’ ability to exploit US space vulnerabilities, 
but because there are many passive and active defences against such a scenario.29 
 Denying the RMA to other states through space control and counter-space 
operations: The belief that the RMA awards military superiority to those who 
exploit it means that the US is not only interested in securing its own space assets. It 
also aims to prevent potential adversaries from obtaining space assets that could help 
the latter exploit the RMA, at least to such an extent as to challenge US superiority. 
This is clearly what Peter Teets, Under-Secretary of the USAF is referring to when 
he notes that new capabilities should be pursued “ ...in order to exploit our nation's 
advantages and protect our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic 
position in the world.”30 US policy in this respect is to temporarily disable hostile 
satellites through jamming or interference.  But the Space Commission Report also 
calls for the ability to destroy these satellites and to use live fire events in space to 
test anti-satellite capabilities.31 The call for space control is reinforced by a USAF 
document entitled the ‘Transformation Flight Plan’, which asserts that: “it will 
require full spectrum, sea, air, land, and space-based offensive counterspace systems 
capable of preventing unauthorized use of friendly space services and negating 
adversarial space capabilities from low earth up to geosynchronous orbits. The 
focus, when practical, will be on denying adversaries access to space on a temporary 
and reversible basis.”32 When not practical, it can be assumed that preventive 
measures will be more permanent. This is an issue of particular concern to the US’s 
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European allies, who are developing the Galileo Global Positioning system with 
Chinese co-operation. Does US policy mean that Galileo may come under US attack 
should the US feel that it gives some RMA advantage to an adversary?   
 Space is the next phase of the RMA: The link between the RMA and space 
goes beyond that of an enabler. The Space Commission Report notes that space is 
not only useful from an RMA perspective in the sense of “passive collection of 
images or signals or a switchboard that can quickly pass information back and forth 
over long distances.”33 It is clear that weaponising space itself forms a part of the 
conceptualisation of the current RMA. The Space Commission Report makes an 
argument for the projection in, from and through space by noting the deterrent effect 
and in conflict, the extraordinary military advantage that this will provide. Weapons 
orbiting in space would reduce lengthy mobilisation periods, currently predicated on 
forward deployed bases, aircraft carriers and airlift capability to transfer weapons 
and soldiers to the battlefield. It would be the ultimate standoff and global strike 
weapon strategy. Space weapons used in an offensive mode could be the next phase 
of the RMA. 
 The Transformation Flight Plan notes that the USAF “is looking at ways to 
collect or generate large quantities of energy on orbit in order to rely on space-based 
platforms for more missions and provide a greater degree of true global presence. 
This would change many equations about traditional ideas of rapid response.”34 The 
document goes on to outline a series of space weapons programmes, the research 
and development of which are likely to commence within the next five years and 
deployment envisioned as soon as 2015.35 This corresponds with US wargaming 
scenarios which presume that space will be weaponised by 2015.36  Some of the 
programmes mentioned in the Transformation Flight Plan include the following:37 
• Air-launched anti-satellite missiles: These missiles will provide the 
capability of intercepting satellites in low earth orbit.  
• Evolutionary air and space global laser engagement (EAGLE) airship 
relay mirrors: Space-based mirrors will extend the range of airborne, 
space and ground-based lasers, projecting different laser powers and 
frequencies to disable targets through illumination to destruction.   
• Ground-based laser: This laser will transmit laser beams through the 
atmosphere to Low-Earth Orbit satellites for defensive and offensive 
space control.  
• Hypervelocity rod bundles (dubbed ‘rods from God’ in the media): 
These rods are foreseen to travel through space at hypervelocity speeds, 
but could in the future be launched to orbit earth and strike ground 
targets on earth from space. 
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• Space-based radio frequency energy weapon: Planned for the long-
term, this will be a constellation of satellites containing high-power 
radio-frequency transmitters that would disrupt, destroy or disable 
electronics and command and control systems.   
 These space weapons programmes are envisioned for the long-term, i.e. 
2015 and beyond, and from what we know, are only on the drawing board and not 
yet in the development phase. However, they suggest that a massive initiative is 
underway. The fact that US military planners are flaunting these plans in such an 
aggressive manner may prompt other powers to develop space weapons of their 
own, which in turn would provide the justification for the US to pursue these 
weapons. Thus, it will effectively result in a self-fulfilling prophecy.   
 
Missile defence and the RMA 
 MD relates to the RMA in two ways, namely: 
 The asymmetry paradigm: The notion that actors hostile to the US will 
develop asymmetric means to counter-balance overwhelming US conventional 
military power can be referred to as the asymmetry paradigm.38 State actors may 
develop non-military asymmetric means, such as diplomatic activities in 
international forums (as was the case in the build-up to the Iraq War in the UN 
Security Council when it became clear that a second resolution to sanction war was 
unlikely to be passed). However, it is the military, especially the non-conventional 
means (notably ballistic missiles with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads) that 
have been used to justify MD, especially because non-state actors may also acquire 
these weapons.39 In this sense MD supports the capability-based approach in that it 
caters for the contingency of any actor acquiring NCB weapons and missiles to 
deliver them without having to identify specific threats.  
 Under President Bill Clinton, MD in the first instance was seen as protection 
of US territory against ballistic missile attack (National Missile Defence) as well as 
forward deployed US forces (Theatre Missile Defence). In December 2002 President 
Bush announced deployment of MD as early as 2004 (a month before presidential 
elections) and he opted for a single architecture (which could eventually be a global 
MD shield).40 It thus became clear that US allies and friends would also be protected 
by the system. The 2004 deployment of MD now seems uncertain due to technical 
failure of several interception tests. In some of the successful tests, interceptors seem 
to have been guided to the warhead of the incoming missile.41  
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 Conventional deterrence: MD corresponds with the shift in deterrence 
doctrine. It renders an adversary’s ability to deter the US through (NCB) missile 
attack on its forces, homeland or friends/allies obsolete. In the absence of mutual 
assured destruction, the option of deterring (or imposing one’s will on) an enemy 
with conventional attack is left opened. Moreover, it is also argued that MD could 
even dissuade adversaries from developing these threat capabilities in the first place 
if they knew that MD would render them useless.42 
 
Conclusion 
 Within the context of current US defence goals there is a strategic 
connection between the RMA and weapons in space on the one hand, and the RMA 
and MD on the other. This connection does not preclude a three-way link of mutual 
dependencies. ‘Thoroughgoing’ RMA requires secure control of space, which in 
turn requires secure and effective MD. The RMA is so heavily dependent on space-
based assets that the many ways in which an enemy could disable key space-based 
reconnaissance and communications elements by a strike from the ground must be 
thoroughly suppressed. 
 On closer inspection, the military advantage of weaponising space is 
questionable. Some have likened space weapons to nuclear weapons, saying that 
their short-term military advantage will soon be replaced by long-term woes of 
proliferation.43 It has also been argued that the US will undermine its own military 
superiority by moving warfare from earth (where it currently has overwhelming 
dominance) into space where other nations may pose competition with relatively 
rudimentary technologies. The notion that the US will be able to achieve full-
spectrum dominance through unilateral space weaponisation will only work if they 
can suppress strikes from earth pre-emptively. Not only are space technologies often 
dual-use, making it difficult to determine whether a civilian satellite is being 
launched as opposed to a space weapon, but pre-emptively shooting down or 
threatening other countries’ space launches could be regarded as acts of war. Such a 
policy could seriously complicate the current tacit acceptance of US military 
superiority among the major powers of the world.   
 Proponents of space weaponisation in the US, most notably the current 
Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, assert that the weaponisation of space is 
inevitable. Space, like land, sea and air, is just another medium of conflict that will 
inevitably see warfare and therefore demands that the US, as a forward-looking 
country, should be the first to exploit this inevitability.44 However, the argument that 
“history has predetermined weapons in space” seems to rest more on technological 
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determinism, dressed up as the so-called capabilities-based approach.  This approach 
asks only ‘how’ and ‘with what’ questions when it comes to warfare (and defence), 
while negating the ‘who’ and ‘why’ questions. The latter questions are essential to 
know the circumstances under which warfare takes place and to make the defence 
responses plausible and realistic.45  
 Planning for contingencies ‘out of context’ suggests that technology-related 
policy choices are not determined by rational cost-benefit analysis, but a drive 
towards perceived technological progress. The weaponisation of space seems to be 
driven by a largely Western worldview that equates technological efficiency in 
military affairs with military efficiency. The two are however, not synonymous as 
we have seen in the Iraq War. Despite the technological superiority of the coalition 
forces, they still have not won the war and it certainly has not been a less bloody war 
than other wars of the past 50 years, neither does it look like a more expedient war.46 
A very narrow and technological interpretation of military efficiency is the only 
context in which the weaponisation of space makes sense. It is argued that US 
military superiority can be extended without weaponising space and unnecessarily 
compromising relations with other powers, most notably Russia and China.47 Space 
seems to be not the next military high ground, but the next technological high 
ground in military affairs.  
 As for MD, the US has been at lengths to reassure China and Russia that 
MD is directed at rogue states and terrorist threats. However, these countries are 
suspicious that US plans for MD may only be a cover for plans of weapons in space, 
especially in the light of the US’s abstention in the UN General Assembly vote on 
the resolution to prevent an arms race in outer space (the resolution supports the 
PAROS initiative in the UN Conference on Disarmament). An initial response by 
China was to link their agreement to a moratorium and eventual convention on the 
production of fissile material (the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty) with negotiations 
on PAROS.48 This play between conventional military power and asymmetric means 
– by reserving the right to produce fissile material, China can increase its 
asymmetric means (nuclear deterrent) to counter US military superiority – is 
indicative of the negative impact of weaponisation of space on non-proliferation. 
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